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applying the principle of contradiction if he regarded things as phenomenal, i. e. as outside of their true being. It is only when we, for practical purposes, regard things as fixed—as having permanent being, just as they are—that we regard them as self-identical, and as not contradictory. Thus it is not in our rational consciousness, but in our first stages of reflection, that we apply these principles. We abstract from the concrete object before us, and apply the principle to the abstraction which we have made. Such a procedure is all well enough until we undertake to know the Concrete, in and for itself. Then we have to leave these abstract principles for principles as concrete as the truth itself. No abstraction holds when we apply to it the “Form of Eternity.” Truth does not need “different points of view” to save it from contradiction; its Negative Unity dissolves all distinction in its resistless menstruum,

and rays forth creatively through the same negative self-relation. Formal Logic and Formal Metaphysic can never seize anything in its *genesis*, but always goes behind one phase merely to posit the same identical distinction over and over again; it holds that “like produces like,” and that distinction comes from distinction and cannot be cancelled. On the other hand, the Speculative Insight *always* regards the process,—sees all things in their *genesis*, and thus can comprehend synthesis as well as analysis. It does not need to keep some distinction “on hand for seed,” fearing, lest it come to the assistance of the world with such principles as “*Ex nihilo nihil fit*,” and the “Eternity of Matter and Force,” that it can never comprehend the phenomena therein. It is aware that he who would seize the world rationally, and be present at its creation, must first ascend into the creative thought.

## THE DIFFERENCE OF BAADER FROM HEGEL.

[We lay before our readers the following communication from Professor Karl Rosenkranz. Aside from the curiosity naturally awakened to hear the words of the philosopher who has occupied for nearly forty years the chair formerly occupied by Kant, the subject itself is one of special interest, particularly in the present connection, as it is discussed in several articles of this number. We are indebted to Mr. Davidson for the translation.—EDITOR.]

*To the President of the Philosophical Society of St. Louis:*

At the end of the third number of the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, there appears a letter from Dr. Hoffmann, Professor at Würzburg, wherein he recommends the study of the philosophy of Franz von Baader. Dr. Hoffmann is now the most distinguished representative of this philosophy. With great personal sacrifices, with admirable perseverance, with genuine enthusiasm, he has made himself its apostle, and has brought out a complete edition of the works of his master, which deserves to be called a model. In the above mentioned communication to you, Mr. President, he has had the kindness to make reference to a work of mine—*The Science of the Logical Idea*—in terms of distinction, for which I cannot be otherwise than grateful to him. When, however, he places it in such a relation to Baader's philosophy as to give the

impression that I, a Hegelian, had come unusually close to it, I feel myself compelled to remark that I have, in part I., pp. 330 sqq. of my work, drawn a perfectly definite distinction between myself and Baader.

Permit me, Mr. President, in a few words to state as clearly as possible the grounds of this distinction.

1. I have endeavored, in my logic, to combat the confusion which has arisen in the school of Hegel between the concept of opposition and that of contradiction. Every opposition, *oppositio*, may become a contradiction, *repugnantia*, but in itself it is not necessarily one. It is not a contradiction when I say that the human species is opposed to itself in the difference between woman and man, or that the state is opposed to itself in the distinction between government and governed, and so on.

2. Opposition becomes contradiction

when things, in themselves opposed, manifest, instead of their proper unity, the diremption thereof. This possibility is necessary, but the actualization of it is accidental.

3. If this actualization takes place, the existence will either (a) be destroyed by the diremption, or (b) overcome the diremption, and reinstate itself in the harmonious unity of opposites: as, for example, the Union has just done in the reconstruction of its Constitution against the insurrection of the Southern States.

Hence, contradiction, as a phenomenon, may have (a) a merely negative, or (b) a positive result.

Therefore, in the concept of the negative, the destructive and the productive directions must be distinguished. It is plain that along with the concept of the true, the concept of the false is necessarily given (*verum index sui et falsi*, as Spinoza says) with that of life, that of disease, with that of the beautiful, that of ugliness, with that of good, that of evil; but it is also plain that the true, life, the beautiful, the good, are the absolute, the positive conditions of the false, disease, ugliness, the evil, respectively. They are the *prius* of the negative forms of their existence, which are, as existences, accidental.

Now, I have endeavored, in the doctrine of contradiction as well as in the doctrine of the negative, to deduce and to explain all the possible forms of the negative as a moment of the evolution of the idea. In connection with this, I have, in certain points, in the concepts of usurpation, of degradation, of monstrosity, approximated to Herr von Baader; but as regards the method in which he derives such forms originally from a "Fall" which he supposes to lie away beyond the origin of the world—from a hypothetical spirit-world—I have assumed a position of decided opposition. I have always combatted the main doctrine

of Baader, which holds to a twofold Nature: a Nature in God, which is supposed to be without matter, and a Nature which was produced in time and space, as matter, only through the Fall; for I have no idea of an immaterial Nature, nor can I, in the universality of law which the study of Nature discovers to us, find any ground for believing in a diabolic production of it. In a skeptical investigation, entitled *The Transfiguration of Nature*, (in the first volume of my Studies, 1839, pp. 155–204,) I have gone into some detail on this subject; in 1853, I published a work with the same tendency, viz.: *The Æsthetics of the Ugly*, &c., &c.

Mystical Logic says, for example, that life is a contradiction of the concept of death; I say, Death is the opposition immanent in, and necessary to, the concept of life. All living must die. On the other hand, disease is a contradiction of life to itself. I cannot say All living must become diseased. Herr von Baader had profound insights into the region of the diabolical; but when he comes to diabolize cold, heat, rage, hurricanes, volcanoes, poisons, savage beasts, &c., I reject such a doctrine as much as the doctrine of demons, devils, angels, &c., who are supposed to influence us.

I consider the world, notwithstanding its evils, as rational; and I see in the freedom which is conscious of itself, the origin of the good no less than of the evil, without making either angels or devils responsible for them.

You will, perhaps, much respected Mr. President, find a page for this brief explanation in the Journal of the Society of which I have the honor to be a member.

With much esteem,

Yours, very faithfully,

KARL ROSENKRANZ.

Königsberg, 7th Jan., 1868.